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Comparative analysis of CSR allows characterizing both corporate society and market institutions. 
Even though transition economies have backwardness of corporate governance institutions and 
include premature CSR, Russian CSR, paradoxically speaking, can be regarded as hyper one, and 
specific stakeholders have played a decisive role in its establishment. The present paper empirically 
and descriptively analyzed evolution of the contemporary Russian CSR and described its 
characteristics. Observations made show that market-type changes are obvious in Russia, companies 
try to adapt to the market changes, but at the same time, the historical inertia is quite strong. 
Moreover, through a comparison of CSR in Russia and Japan it was proved that a certain type of 
hybrid CSR exists in both countries, due to the existence of path-dependence institutions and a new 
impact of globalization. 
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  1Introduction 
Market transition has been taking place for around 20 years.   Central European and East European 
countries have joined the EU, and their economies have been deeply integrated into European 
business society.    As a result of high economic growth in the 2000s, economic institutions in Russia 
also changed.  Russia developed formal market institutions and rules, and Russian companies 
superficially adapted themselves to these liberal institutions (Knell and Srholec, 2007).  Even 
though the economic crisis in 2009–2010 damaged the Russian economy, it indicated that Russia has 
become an indispensable component of the world capitalist system, in the sense that fluctuations in 
business in Russia affect business in developed capitalist countries.    The transition has changed the 
centre of gravity of capitalism in transition economies. 
   The varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach
2 provides a clue of influential typology.  Hall and 
Soskice (2001) define two ideal types of coordination of modern capitalism: liberal market 
economies and coordinated market economies.  Following Hall and Soskice (2001) with regard to 
degree of privatization, development level of stock markets, globalization, and economic 
performance, the survey of transition economies by VoC (Lane, 2007) classifies three types of 
capitalism: the continental type of market capitalism (Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Estonia); hybrid state-market uncoordinated capitalism (Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Moldova); and those that have not made the breakthrough 
to a capitalist system (Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Turkmenistan)
3.  Traditionally, VoC is severely 
criticized because it is heavily biased towards corporation-centred analysis (Yamada, 2008).  
However, the analysis by VoC of transition economies is quite different.  VoC and the 
aforementioned survey focus on the macroeconomic indicators in practice.    The characterization of 
the capitalist system in transition economies needs to be re-examined from the viewpoint of 
corporation-oriented analysis. 
   Other criticisms of VoC are its inability to factor in crises and politics and its static approach 
(Yamada, 2008).  As a matter of fact, many studies use normative concepts such as ownership, 
markets, and welfare state.  The current global economic crisis, however, demands a 
re-examination of these normative concepts.  For example, the criticism of ‘the self-regulating 
market
4 and fictitious commodities’ in modern capitalism has now been re-evaluated (Polanyi, 2001). 
Polanyi stressed the diversity of capitalism and the importance of non-market economic institutions.   
Another noteworthy scholar who has been reassessed is Peter F. Drucker, who was a contemporary 
 
                                                            
2 Karl Polanyi (2001) is said to become a motive power of VoC in 1980s-1990s.  How the market is embedded 
determines the type of capitalism.    See Introduction by Fred Block (Polanyi, 2001). 
3  Mizobata ed. (2008) investigated VoC and Transformation.    Hanson and Teague (2007) criticized existing VoC for 
Russian capitalism. 
4 ‘A market economy is an economic system, controlled, regulated and directed by markets alone; order in the 
production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism’ (Polanyi, 1963, p.68) 
‘Self-regulating implies that all production is for sale on the market and that all incomes derive from such sales’ 
(Polanyi, 1963, p.69). 
  2of Karl Polanyi.    Although both scholars held opposite views, they influenced each other and had a 
common theoretical fear of excessive markets and state (Immerwahr, 2009).  They did not regard 
profit to be a natural motivation for human beings. 
Drucker focused on the business/company as the key institution in subordinating markets to 
society.   According to Drucker (1993), the business/company is a specific player that characterizes 
the capitalist system.  He stressed that the business is a social organization that satisfies social 
needs.    Traditionally, the VoC approach considers corporation-centred analysis in the narrow sense.   
Based on Drucker’s work, business cannot be analyzed separately from society and state.  In 
practice, Drucker (1981) highly valued the Japanese management system (decision by consensus, 
lifetime employment, continuous training, and the godfather system) for solving US problems (such 
as lack of safety in society).  Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become the focus of 
attention in describing business society (relationship between business and society) and in measuring 
the social contributions of business, the balance of stakeholders, and the efficiency of corporate 
governance.  In particular, some decisions on the global standards of CSR (UN in 2000) and 
Corporate Governance (OECD in 1999) indicate the importance of CSR analysis.  In addition, the 
following review stimulates comparative CSR analysis.  Firstly, comparative business and 
management have emphasized CSR.  The Japan Association for Comparative Studies of 
Management (2006) characterized the mature business society and the transformation of business 
society through a comprehensive analysis of CSR.  Secondly, comparative institutional analysis 
also enlarged the scope of its investigation to include CSR (Aoki, 2010).  In fact, CSR has 
strengthened in Russia and Japan. 
CSR first made an appearance in Japan in 2003.  During the 1970s, corporate trials involving 
public pollution occurred frequently, as a result of which CSR became the focus of public attention.   
However, at that time, concerns about CSR were not raised because of the lack of NGOs and 
employees loyal to management.  In addition, recession and financial constraints put a damper on 
CSR.  After the announcement of the UN (Global Compact) in 1999, CSR once again became 
popular.  Globalization has further intensified this interest; consequently, in 2003, many Japanese 
enterprises demonstrated a positive attitude towards CSR. 
Firstly, global environmental problems (the Kyoto Protocol) and the environmental movement 
towards sustainable development have strongly influenced CSR; under these conditions, both 
governments and the public have demanded that companies be more responsible.  Besides these 
positive results, global impact has also had some negative impacts: globalization in the spheres of 
production, trade, distribution, and information have highlighted miserable labour conditions and 
human rights problems.  As the result, public evaluation at the global level is now regarded as 
indispensable to activity assessments of transnational corporations. 
Secondly, the market is evaluated by CSR, and a typical case may become a ‘social responsible 
  3investment’ (SRI).  Companies are presently assessed from a CSR angle that makes further 
investment and financing feasible.  Individuals with high social consciousness sensibilities as well 
as institutional investors such as pension funds tend to select highly valued companies.  Corporate 
law reforms (2002) and the obligatory introduction of internal control (2006) have also positively 
affected CSR in Japan. 
A trend can be observed in Russia.  Corporate reform and globalization have strongly 
influenced CSR activities in Russia and have achieved normalization of the Russian market.  
Market transition in the corporate sector has penetrated the social sphere.  Specifically, as many 
corporate political scandals such as the Yukos affair in 2003 suggest, the evolution of CSR vividly 
indicates social changes, institutional arrangements, and state-firm relations in Russia.  However, 
Russian CSR seems to be specific.  The ‘Pikalevo’, Leningrad oblast, episode provides an 
understanding of Russian CSR. 
Three factories in Pikalevo (company town) city (BaselCement owned by Oleg Deripaska; 
EvroCement group; and Metakhim, SevZavProm
5) ceased production as a result of the 2008 
economic crisis.  They began to make extensive layoffs and they stopped salary payments: wage 
debts became a critical problem and the concerned facilities were closed.  As the company was a 
utility plant that provided Pikalevo’s heat and hot water, city functions such as heat and hot water 
provision ceased.  Prime Minister V. Putin then met the managers and the governor in a public 
meeting, and criticized them.    He said, ‘If you (owners) cannot agree between yourselves, it will be 
done without you….    I must say that you have made thousands of residents of Pikalevo hostages of 
your ambition, your unprofessionalism, and, maybe, simply your greed.  Thousands of people.  
Where is business social responsibility?    It is absolutely unacceptable’ (V. Putin’s announcement in 
Pikalevo on 4 June 2009, http://www.ksovok.com/pikalevo.htm, 28 May 2010).
6 
   When CSR is based on the composition of stakeholders and the corporate governance structure, 
it is an effective tool in understanding the specificities of corporate society and social changes.  
This paper has two aims: first, I investigate Russian CSR in detail in order to understand Russian 
firms and business society.    Second, I compare Russian CSR with Japanese CSR.    Neither of these 
types of CSR can be regarded as similar to CSR in other developed countries.    Japan implemented 
CSR much after Western countries did, and Russia imported CSR even after Japan did; therefore, 
CSR in Russia is the least mature.  CSR in both Russia and Japan reflect these countries’ own 
historical traditions and experiences.  Through a study of CSR in Russia and Japan, I will draw 
some theoretical implications of comparative CSR analysis. 
CSR is said to be positive in the following types of companies (Tanimoto, 2008): companies with 
high turnover, companies with high sales in foreign markets and a large proportion of holding by 
                                                            
5  The total employment figure is more than 3,000, and three companies are town forming companies. 
6 After the conflict, the ministry of industry and trade negotiated with the factories, and an agreement among 
concerned parties was concluded in September 2010 (http://www.minprom.gov.ru, 17 September 2010). 
  4foreigners, and companies related to the environment.  This holds true only in Japan, but also in 
Russia.  A CSR comparison reveals that different stakeholders and different pressures produce 
divergent CSR, despite the trend of convergence that is a result of global pressures.  Different 
stakeholders have selected their own institutional CSR arrangements, and Russia and Japan have 
developed separate models, which differ from those used in Europe and the US. 
Empirically, I use data for the Japanese model, which includes survey data by Keizai Doyukai 
(Japan Association of Corporate Executives) in 2003
7, 2006
8, 2008, 2009, and 2010
9, as well as 
other official data
10.  In addition, the recent annual social reports from some leading companies 
have been quite instructive.  For the Russian model, I use my own interview and questionnaire 
research
11 from 2004–2006, in addition to another empirical survey and recent data from the 
Managers’ Association and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP).  The 
questionnaire survey by the Higher School of Economics in Russia in 2007, which includes a survey 
of 303 industrial firms
12, is the most important.    In addition, to empirically describe Russian CSR, I 
use data from ‘Firms and Market in 2005–2009’ by the Higher School of Economics and some 
official information of the Russian companies. 
                                                          
 
 
1. What is CSR? 
CSR is regarded as fundamental corporate behaviour for compliance with rules and profit-making.  
Milton Friedman had the most influential views on CSR.  He emphasized accountability to 
shareholders as far as the company obeys rules and ethical habits.  ‘The view has been gaining 
widespread acceptance that corporate officials and labour leaders have a social responsibility that 
goes beyond serving the interest of their stakeholders or their members.  This view shows a 
fundamental misconception of the character and nature of a free economy….    There is one and only 
one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open 
and free competition, without deception or fraud’ (Friedman, 1962, p.133).  The market quality 
theory
13 may be regarded as having followed this view; it stresses the improvement of market 
 
7  Data of 229 companies in 2003. 
8  Data of 527 companies during October 2005 to January 2006. 
9  Data of 445 companies during December 2009 to January 2010. 
10 Data of Keidanren and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Japan, 2004, Japan Research Institute Report, 
2009, and others. 
11  Data of interview and questionnaire research were analyzed in Mizobata (2008).    The paper comes to the 
conclusion that there is a kind of mixed corporate governance in Russia (an amalgam of Russian tradition and liberal 
reforms) in Russia. 
12 The survey includes the following industries: 8.3% in chemicals and petrochemicals, 47.4% in machine building, 
12.1% in timber and papermaking, 8.1% in construction materials, 6.6% in the light industry, and 17.5% in the food 
industry.  The types of companies include 40.8% limited companies, 38.9% open joint stock companies, 16.6% 
closed joint stock companies and 2.7% state unitary enterprises. 
13 Makoto Yano insisted on the importance of market quality: ‘In a very broad sense, it may be defined as an index 
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and high quality markets are indispensable for achieving healthy economic growth.  The market 
cannot work without competition and rules (laws).  Compliance, maturity of players, culture and 
subculture, organization, institutions and governance, and habits and customs are also indispensable 
to the functioning of the market (Yano, 2009).   
Opposite to shareholder-biased CSR is stakeholder-biased, which has recently begun to be 
supported by recent business administrations.  Stakeholders are a factor in CSR decision-making.  
For example, Tanimoto (2008, p.59) described CSR as follows: ‘the essential point of CSR is to 
incorporate social fairness, ethics, [and] environmental and human rights in the management process 
to make clear their accountabilities to the stakeholders’.  CSR is made up of three dimensions: 
business activity, social work, and philanthropy (Tanimoto, 2008, pp.66–74).  Therefore, when we 
study CSR, it is important to consider the stakeholders of the company. 
However, stakeholder-biased CSR must not be mistaken for excessive responsibility.  Tanimoto 
(2008) cautiously states that profitability must be the key focus of responsibility.  Peter Drucker 
(1993) also criticized the excessive extension of CSR.  On the one hand, Drucker criticized 
shareholder capitalism as harmful and irresponsible.  When the value of knowledge is as high as 
that of capital, human capital must be focused on.  On the other hand, he criticized contemporary 
CSR concepts.  ‘The new concept of social responsibility no longer asks what the limitations on 
business are, or what business should be doing for those under its immediate authority.    It demands 
that business take responsibility for social problems, social issues, social and political goals, and that 
it become the keeper of society’s conscience and the solver of society’s problems’ (p.315).  
‘Managers need to be able to think through the limits on social responsibility set by their duty to the 
performance capacity of the enterprise in their charge’ (p.344).  Drucker regarded Milton 
Friedman’s views as ‘not a denial of responsibility’ (p.348)
14.  In short, the new concept of CSR 
requires the harmonization of profit motivation and ‘responsibility for the common good’ (p.349). 
Under mounting global pressure, many companies have accepted CSR, and the Global Compact 
‘Corporate Citizenship in the World Economy’ of the UN (July 2000) has become the basic principle 
in Japan and Russia.  ‘The UN Global Compact asks companies to embrace, support, and enact, 
within their sphere of influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards, 
environment, and corruption’ (UN, 2000).  Specifically, multinationals cannot ignore these 
principles.    CSR has already been standardized into an ISO (ISO26000). 
In Japan, as shown in Table 1, more than 90% of companies have implemented compliance and 
high quality goods as part of their CSR initiative; a volunteering and proactive attitude has grown.  
In 2010, the quality of goods was the top CSR concept.    Russia also shows a recent CSR boom with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
capturing how well a market functions’ (Yano, 2009, p.1). 
14  Drucker denied Friedman, ‘Milton Friedman’s “pure” position—to eschew all social responsibility—is not tenable 
either’ (p.349). 
  6companies wishing to enhance their reputations.    It is said that more than 90% of companies have a 
CSR strategy or are currently drawing up CSR plans.  In 2008, 120 social reports were published 
(Vedomosti, 9 December 2008).   
Since stakeholders and their interests and powers differ according to country, the motivation to 
adopt CSR differs in each country.  As Table 1 and Figure 1 indicate, basic points are common to 
both Japan and Russia, but differences can be observed.  The most impressive difference is that 
Japanese firms (J firms) are more sensitive to CSR than are Russian firms (R firms).  J firms 
recognize the following as components of CSR: compliance, good products, global environmental 
protection, and tax payment.  In particular, many J firms have a strong interest in contributing to 
solving global environmental problems (eco-activities), and they engage in various forms of 
philanthropy.  However, less than half R firms have implemented CSR.  With regard to the 
components of CSR, while J firms have emphasized dividends to shareholders and philanthropy, R 
firms have made little of them and have emphasized obligatory factors, including wage payment, 
investment in production, and more basic items such as reducing corruption and increasing public 
information.    In Russia, CSR is a fundamental obligation of companies. 
In both countries, the stakeholders determine the different implementation levels of CSR.  In 
Japan, employees sufficiently understand most corporate values (Table 2), and the company focuses 
on its customers.  When employees are promoted to management, it is usual for them to wield 
power, and all company insiders (managers and employees) commonly regard customers to be the 
most important
15.  Traditionally, governments are not very active in CSR, and they regard CSR to 
be voluntary behaviour.  However, due to frequent corporate scandals and the recent economic 
crisis, governments intend to tighten CSR in the following areas: (1) the environment, (2) food 
security, (3) financial institutions, and (4) employment.  Above all, with respect to the process of 
CSR legalization, governments have become more active.  For example, after the mid 1990s, the 
government introduced recycling laws, economizing energy, and consumer protection.    These laws 
have transformed CSR into compliance and legal areas. 
Although Russia has similar stakeholders, the Russian government is beyond their influence.  
Specifically, in company towns, companies dominate local society, and their social responsibility 
overlaps with the role of the government.  In practice, many regional governments forge a social 
agreement with companies.    Traditionally, Russian managers have motivated lobbyism (Vedomosti, 





                                                            
15  See Drucker (1993, Chapter 6). 
  7Table 1 Components of CSR in Japan (2002–2010) 
       2005  2002 2005–2002  2010 
1  Compliance  94.6％  2  +13.2  2   89% 
2    High quality of goods and services  91.4％  1  –1.7  1   91% 
3  Environmental  protection  80.8％  5  +18.9  3   78% 
4    Benefits and tax payment  74.7％  3  –0.2  5   71% 
5    Contribution to the regional society  72.3％  7  +20.7  4   77% 
6    Human rights protection  68.3％  10  +36.0  6   69% 
7  Dividends  66.9％  4  –0.7  8   61% 
8    Non-provision of harmful goods and services  65.1％  9 +19.7  10    57% 
9  Job  creation  57.3%  8  +9.3  7   62% 
10   New technology and knowledge  54.7%  6  +2.6  9      57% 
11   Social contribution by philanthropy and mecenat 45.7%  11  +23.9  11  39% 
12   Poverty  and  settlement  of  disputes   16.4%  12  +12.8  12  19% 
Source: Keizai Doyukai, 2006, 2010 
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  8Table 2 Players in Japan who are well aware of corporate values (2005) 
  Employees    1.16  
  Customers, suppliers    0.98  
  Institutional investors    0.85  
  Analysts    0.82  
  Rating institutions    0.65  
  General investors    0.15  
Note: Know well: 2; know to some degree: 1; do not understand well: -1; ignorant: -2 
Source: Keizai Doyukai, 2006 
 
   We attempt a deeper understanding of CSR in Russia.  The Managers’ Association in Russia 
(2004a, p.8) determines CSR to be a voluntary contribution of business to social development that 
relates to main operations.   The behaviour philosophy and belief of this organization is as follows: 
business society, firms, and individual entrepreneurs retain the object of resource preservation for 
sustainable growth and future generations, based on high quality, attractive place of work and human 
capital investment, reciprocal relations with stakeholders, effective business, social expectations and 
ethics, and contribution to civil society through partnership relations (Managers’ Association, 2006, 
p.4).  This view is in perfect harmony with global standards.  CSR is neither a market nor a 
government activity. 
      The Managers’ Association and Peregudov and Semenenko (2008) emphasized market and social 
reports as CSR activities.  To a lesser extent, managers in the 2000s used CSR for improving 
corporate image and reputation or for following global standards. 
   However, the above view is just formal and differs in ‘principle and practice’.  Russian 
specialists are extreme about the extent of state responsibility in understanding CSR.    Beraeva and 
Eskindarov eds. (2008) include mutual responsibility among civil society, business and state, and 
social control.  Krishevsky and Goncharov (2008) also include state responsibility in the social 
sphere and characterize Russian CSR as transfer from state intensive type to state integral type.    In 
addition, as Putin stated, the governments coerced managers into conducting public CSR activities.  
The CSR concept lies not in a formal announcement but in reality. 
 
 
2. Evolution of Russian CSR 
The opinion poll indicates contradictory attitudes to business in Russia.  On the one hand, the 
people have adopted a negative attitude towards big business, so-called oligarchies (88% in 2004 by 
IKSI, RAN), and it is natural for CSR to not be highly valued.    Many firms undertake parasitic and 
irresponsible operations, and there are no responsible firms.    Many businessmen do not responsibly 
  9cover the labour conditions of their own companies, and the European Management Institute ranked 
Russia at the bottom in 2007 (http://www.mirec.ru, Mirovoe i natsional’noe khozyaistovo, 
G.P.Chernikov, No.4, 2008). 
On the other hand, expectations from business have grown.  Inconsistently, research by IKSI 
showed that 62% of the population regarded big business positively.  Even though the people 
dislike oligarchs (specific privileged Russian capitalists), they regard big business to be a necessity.   
Above all, as Figure 2 indicates, the creation of new jobs, social welfare, and local infrastructure are 
the main fields of expectation (Krichevsky and Goncharov, 2008, p.61). 
 













Source: Krichevsky and Goncharov, 2008, p.61 
 
The practical evolution of CSR in Russia is based on globalization and the response of business 
society to globalization.    The following chronicle vividly illustrates the evolution process in Russia.   
According to the UN Global Compact, many firms released social reports and the Code on Corporate 
Behaviour and Corporative Business Ethics Charter of the RSPP, which were the main products of 
corporate governance reform.  In November 2004, RSPP adopted the ‘Social Charter of Russian 
Business’, the social activity prescribed to all firms.    It is obvious that corporate reform went hand 
in hand with the introduction of CSR rules.  At the same time, the government established a CSR 
forum.  This forum engages in the investigation, introduction, and consultation of CSR, CSR 
promoting congress, and cooperation with global organizations.    Both the government and business 
society are active in adopting the global management CSR standards. 
 
Chronicle of CSR evolution in Russia 
1995: CSR Europe was established. 
1996: ISO introduced its ISO 14000 environmental management systems series of standards. 
1999: UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called on business to enact a set of core values in the area 
  10of CSR.   
2000: The Global Compact (more than 120 countries) was launched as a voluntary corporate 
citizenship initiative.    Based on the Global Compact, some firms announced CSR.    In 2009, more 
than 37 firms joined it and published non-financial reports. 
2002: Lukoil announced CSR for the first time in Russia. 
2002: Corporate Conduct Code, Corporative Business Ethics Charter by RSPP 
February 2003: Forum on Social Investment: Interaction of Business and State; Social Programme 
by Managers’ Association 
March 2003: Social Strategy of Russian Business by Academy of Sciences 
2004: RSPP adopted Social Charter of Russian Business.   
2004: Prime Minister M. Fradkov supported RSPP.   
2004: International Project Bureau adopted Business Culture for CSR rating. 
2006: UN PRI, RSPP ‘Non-financial Report’   
2007: The National Forum of CSR was established by the State Federal House of Society and others. 
December 2009: Meeting of ‘Business and Society’ was held, with the support of the government. 
2010: RSPP ‘Human resources as a means of modernization method’ 
 
Even though many firms paid attention to the RSPP Social Charter, actual participation was 
restricted.    Many top managers did not understand that CSR investment affected long-term success.   
845,112 employees participated in the charter and, for small enterprises, CSR only requires the 
observance of laws (http://www.ksovok.com,  http://www.csr-rspp.ru/social, 28 May 2010).  The 
CSR national forum was established in 2007 and carried out various kinds of consulting and 
cooperative actions. 
      The national forum strengthened CSR in the following directions during the global crisis (27 July 
2009): job support to residents
16; decision-making by local authorities (in agreement with regional 
authorities); and enlargement of government scope (http://www.csrforum.ru, 28 May 2010).  CSR 
has become indispensable as an anti-crisis measure, and, in fact, we may take more CSR-related 
anti-crisis measures. 
      Then, why does Russia enthusiastically pay attention to CSR?    Here, I will stress the following 
five aspects, and combined failures. 
   First of all, CSR came about as a response to abnormal privatization in the 1990s.  Oligarchic 
businesses (integrated business organizations), transfer of state assets to private hands, and 
state-business relations (so-called grabbing hands) are considered to be part of this abnormal 
business society.   CSR is intended as an atonement for the sins of big businesses, who believe that 
                                                            
16  Companies participated in drawing up a social programme.    While in the pre-crisis period, they paid 1.5–2 billion 
dollars annually to philanthropy; after the crisis, they applied this money to employment support (retraining and 
adaptation of unemployed and others).   
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   Secondly, despite marketization and liberalization, markets cannot provide social goods 
efficiently.  In addition, the behaviour of many R firms, such as corruption, is a violation of laws 
and fairness.    Russia’s fragile market has also destabilized the social functions of actors.    CSR is a 
result of ‘market failure’. 
   Thirdly, instability of the state results in CSR initiatives.  Corruption and unstable government 
institutions seem to weaken corporate governance and destabilize the provision of social welfare 
goods.  Particularly in cases of concentration of federal authority and insufficient development of 
municipalities, CSR is believed to substitute the government (municipalities).  CSR is a result of 
‘state failure’. 
      Fourthly, as the evolution of CSR suggests, globalization can be a driving force of the spread of 
CSR.  Global standards (such as the UN Compact) are imported, and the growth of domestic 
companies into multinationals requires the adoption of global rules, including CSR standards.  
Particularly, the rapid development of mergers and acquisitions in domestic and foreign markets has 
forced Russian companies to adopt global rules.    CSR is a response to external pressure. 
   Fifthly, the social functions of companies have been deeply embedded in Russian society.  
Traditionally, companies built their own schools and accommodation and, during the Soviet period, 
the concept of sotsialka, meaning labour protection and improvement of labour conditions, was 
popular.  The company town (mono-city) was also considered to be a historical landmark of 
Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union.  From this perspective, the deep-rooted Russian and Soviet 
legacy strongly affected CSR.    CSR is a historical product. 
 
 
3. Case study of Russian CSR 
We see many cases of CSR activities on the home pages and in the social reports of Gazprom, Avto 
VAZ, Lukoil, Interros, Evrokhim, Norilsk Nickel, Mosenrgo, SUBR, COMSTAR, SUAL-Holding, 
MDM bank, former YUKOS, and others.    Moreover, we can include some foreign affiliates in this 
line-up.  For example, limited company TOYOTA (TMMR) and some other Japanese affiliates 
have made their social reports public. 
      Gazprom carried out a special scheme, ‘Gazprom-children’, and financed 4.5 billion rubles to 65 
regions for youth support, cultural activity, charity, domestic education, and sports support.  In 
addition, Gazprom made its environment and ecology report public.  On its website, Gazprom 
claims that it budgets more than 1.5 billion rubles for CSR.    Due to Gazprom’s heavy influence, tax 
payment may be considered to be a main part of CSR.  Moreover, as Gazprom’s projects relate to 
natural resource development, environmental standards cannot be ignored.  For example, special 
environmental standards (the Equator Principles) have been observed in the Sakhalin 2 project 
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Lukoil also publicized various kinds of social functions; its principles hold that there can be no 
CSR without high performance.  The following functions are included: accommodation provision; 
social insurance; social investment; charity and philanthropy; in-house education; health care; 
environment protection; dialogue with the local community; cooperation agreement with the 
regional authorities; and others.  The same activities can be illustrated in the case of Norilsk 
Nickel
17. 
The Russian railroad published various in-house CSR regulations, such as the CSR Code and 
Business Ethics Law in 2006.   The CSR Code comprises general rules; aims; initial principles; the 
protection of nature and saving resource measures; responsible enterprises; local society; NPO and 
labour movement; state and regional organizations; and the mass media and others (http://doc.rzd.ru, 
28 May 2010).    COMSTAR-OTS adopted its own CSR policy (2008) and published a social report.   
This policy was harmonized with the RSPP Social Charter in 2009, and the activities were based on 
global reporting initiatives. 
      MDM bank decided that 1% of its profits would be spent on CSR in 2007 (CSR strategy).    Not 
only CSR reports but also original CSR approaches were published (http://mdm.ru, 28 May 2010).  
MDM was merged with YRSA bank and the merged entity carried out united CSR activities.  
MDM is based on the stakeholder approach, in which the regional society becomes a crucial CSR 
player. 
   According to data from ‘Business and Society’ by RSPP on 10 December 2009, 75 companies 
published 198 non-financial reports: 33 environment reports, 115 social reports, and 50 stable 
development reports.    The publication of these reports has improved financing in the domestic and 
foreign markets.  Small and medium enterprises, however, are ignorant of CSR, and almost all 
companies adopting CSR are big businesses (70) that operate in global markets. 
   Data on non-financial reports by RSPP in 2006 also shows that one-third of companies have no 
web-site or non-financial reports that promote social investments.  Many are biased towards social 
reports (65%).  As a result, the Social Charter of 2004 became an outline of CSR, though many 
Russian firms used their own CSR indicators
18. 
Although CSR in Russia is concentrated in big businesses and companies that operate in global 




                                                            
17  Norilsk Nickel has been called a social-effective company.  See the paper ‘CSR: myth and reality’ 
http://lib.molodinfonews.by, 31 July 2007.   
18 In 2004, GRI was used in 30% companies and AA 1000 was 18%, Global contract was 9%.  43% used various 
kinds of original reports (Krichevsky and Goncharov, 2008, p.90). 
  134. Size and scope of CSR in Russia 
Evaluations of CSR in Russia are contradictory.    On the one hand, CSR in Russian companies may 
be regarded as poor, because of poor knowledge and poor practice.  Immature consciousness of 
people and companies and insufficient publication of non-financial reports testify to the poor level of 
CSR.    Russian business has become irresponsible after the transition.    On the other hand, Russia’s 
CSR may be considered to be hyper, because the ratio of individual charity to company charity is 
extremely low and because companies excessively provide welfare goods (Polishchuk, 2009).  
Seventy companies participated in philanthropy, and more than 100 philanthropy funds have already 
been established (Beryaeva and Eskindarov eds., 2008, p.112). 
      Of these two extreme points of view, the latter seems to be puzzling, due to the contradiction of 
the normal and abnormal Russian market.  At the very least, the non-transparent corporate 
governance of Russian companies proves that CSR in Russia is immature. 
The following two factors, however, lead us to the ‘hyper’ (or ‘limitless’) point of view. 
Firstly, the formalization of CSR in regions and cities strengthens the degree of CSR.  The 
prototype of regional agreement (for socio-economic cooperation) was created in Kemerovo oblast, 
between the large companies and the regional authorities.  This has spread to other regions in the 
second half of the 1990s (A. Oleinik, Vedomosti, 21 May 2010).    For example, Severo-Ural city and 
SUBR agreed to establish a social partnership in 2001; the local government and the company 
improved regional socio-economic conditions and maintained company towns within the city.  
Regional agreements have already spread to various regions and levels of municipalities.  For 
instance, SUAL-Holding agreed to a social partnership with 13 municipalities in 2001: okrug 
(district) (Kamensk-Ural’sky city), rayon (Shelekhov), and municipal settlement (Nadvoity).  In 
some cases, representatives of holding companies and plural municipal authorities also participated 
in the agreement.  The western model was similar to this local formalization.  After the second 
half of the 1990s, local community partnership funds emerged in 22 areas at the end of 2008.    Local 
governments stimulated NPO formation (Peregudov and Semenenko, 2008, 2009, pp.16–17)
19. 
Secondly, public-private partnership (PPP) is also included in CSR in Russia.  PPP is a 
partnership among NPOs, municipalities, authorities, and enterprises.    PPP covers health, education, 
accommodation and public road building, and culture.  For example, ‘Yasnaya polyana’ in 2004 
was based on the agreement between Tula oblast and the open joint stock company ‘Shekinazot’, and 
sought to develop regional society based on humanitarian resources.  PPP has its own restrictions: 
administrative barriers, lack of tax benefits, lack of specialists, low trust of concerned players and 
others.  Therefore, even though PPP has played an important role, this role has not been sufficient 
(Peregudov and Semenenko, 2009).  Moreover, people continue to hope for the support of 
                                                            
19 Andre Yakovlev insists that assistance to local and regional authorities by the firms has been provided (28 July 
2010, Sweden ICCEES conference). 
  14companies in regions and municipalities.  According to a questionnaire survey (HSE, 2010, p.63), 
three-quarters of firms have supported them independently of scale. 
As a result, Russian business has diverted 10–30% of profits to social investment (Polishchuk, 
2009).    In 2003, the annual social investment per employee was 28,330 rubles, which was 1.96% of 
total sales and 11.25% of total profits.    Among them, transportation, the chemical industry, and the 
steel industry were the sectors with the highest investment per employee (Ekonomika i zhizn’, No.1, 
2005).  The above amounts are not exceptions.  According to the ‘Raspadskoi’ agreement in 
Kemerovo oblast in 2009, the expenditure of the company for the social programme was 3% of net 
profits (A. Oleinik, Vedomosti, 21 May 2010). 
As shown in Table 3, each sector indicates its own expenditure composition in social investment.   
Here, we divide expenditure into two directions: inward motivation (measures for the companies’ 
management) and outward motivation (measures for regional community).  We observe an inverse 
relation between these two directions.  In addition, almost all sectors prefer inward motivation to 
outward motivation. 
 
Table 3 Social investment by expenditure direction (%) 
   Personnel 
training 
Health  Resource 
reduction 
Ethics  Local 
community 
Others 
Fuel   37.0  6.1  35.5  5.5  10.9  4.9 
Nonferrous   36.4  15.5  37.7  2.2  7.0  1.0 
Steel  47.8  7.0  32.0  1.3  10.5  1.6 
Electricity  40.7  9.1  42.0  1.3  4.9  1.8 
Timber  48.4  9.7  15.9  1.7  16.9  7.2 
Machinery  61.8  6.8  5.5  15.5  9.0  1.2 
Consumer 
Goods 
47.1  10.1  11.7  1.2  20.2  9.4 
Chemical  42.9  11.2  35.1  1.2  5.5  3.8 
Service  79.1  0.4  0.0  9.9  10.5  0.0 
Communication 70.0  10.8  0.4  1.9  3.1  13.5 
Transportation  58.4  33.0  2.9  1.5  2.8  1.1 
Finance  75.9  0.0  0.0  6.9  17.0  0.0 
Commerce  59.0  10.6  17.7  0.0  12.7  0.0 
Holding 
company 
31.7  13.8  18.6  0.9  20.9  14.0 
Average  52.3  12.6  17.0  3.7  10.1  4.0 
Source: Managers’ Association, 2004b 
  15Table 4 Recruiting method of qualified employees (% of 303 total responses) 
They voluntarily join the company.  41.1 
The personnel section of the company recruits them.  65.9 
They come from the company.  42.0 
They train in educational institutions.  20.9 
The company concludes agreements with the educational institutions.  23.9 
The company fails recruitment.  12.9 
Note: Plural responses are permitted. 
Source: Questionnaire in 2007 
 
Both directions have their own motivation.   Inward motivation requires personnel management 
and job training, business strategy, reputation, market adaptation, requirements of multinationals, PR, 
and good relations with stakeholders.  Table 4 indicates that in-house training and recruitment 
become an important task.  Outward motivation includes the following composition: obligatory 
norms and rules and administrative pressure.  Even though firms are biased towards inward 
motivation, outward motivation is also important because of business-state relations.   
Administrative pressure is bigger than top-managers’ voluntarism, and bureaucrats agree with this 
attitude. 
Thus, although CSR in Russia is slightly under-developed, its influence is larger than it appears 
to be.  Regional agreements and PPP characterize hypertrophy and limitlessness of authority.  If 
authority and responsibility are not clearly determined, then the above hypertrophy and limitlessness 
result in non-responsibility and lust for power. 
 
 
5. Features of Russian CSR 
Russian CSR is based on stakeholders and institutional stability and has similarities with and 
differences from global experiences. 
First, the narrow interests of stakeholders are central, and incomplete institutions have defined 
the particulars of Russian CSR.  Specifically, companies have emphasized inward motivated 
investment and CSR has become a part of business strategy.  In Russia, where minor stakeholders 
such as consumers, residents, and others do not have a defined way to promote their interests, CSR 
may be a substitute for incomplete laws and social institutions; companies will carry out operations 
of the state due to the failure of the state (Managers’ Association, 2004a).  CSR cannot satisfy the 
interests of various stakeholders, and when companies have sufficient resources, the state tries to 
apply pressure on companies. 
Secondly, CSR is not a new condition in Russian companies, but its original and traditional 
  16condition; at the very least, the Soviet legacy has determined the continuance of CSR.  From this 
point of view, CSR has evolved path-dependently, and contemporary CSR may well be regarded as a 
transition from the Soviet paternalistic model to the market model (Peregudov and Semenenko, 2008, 
p.10). 
In the evolution process of CSR, what is Russia’s inheritance?  First of all, many companies 
have assets on the side, such as accommodation, kindergarten schools, communist children’s 
organizations, recreational facilities, sanatoriums, hospitals, clubs, and others.  The above goods 
may be regarded as public or semi-public goods.  While some of them were transferred to 
municipalities by presidential decree on 10 January 1993 (municipalization of social assets), and 
were privatized, commercialized, and reorganized, most were retained by companies due to a lack of 
municipal finance and ability.    In practice, in 2000, both regular and temporary forms of assistance 
was provided by companies (Ekonomika i zhizn’, No.38, September 2002, p.2). 
The second inheritance for CSR is industry-monopolistic companies and company towns in the 
following sectors: gas, petroleum, defence, automobiles, steel, timber processing industries, and 
others.  This type of city includes 43 cities with populations of more than 100 thousand, 78 cities 
with populations of 50–100 thousand, 125 cities with populations of 25–50 thousand, and 221 cities 
with populations of less than 25 thousand. 
There are some types of company town in Russia: (1) One company accounts for more than 50% 
of the employed population, and the payments of this company exceed 30% of the municipal budget; 
25% of its employed population work there, and its production accounts for more than 50% of 
regional industrial production.  (2) The 1998 bankruptcy law requires that more than half of the 
residents become employees of the company.  (3) A 1994 government regulation determines more 
than 30% of the total labour force of companies that possess socio-cultural infrastructure.  (4) The 
World Bank requires that the company guarantees jobs for more than 25% of residents, and that it 
account for more than half of the city’s production.  In general, the company town has dual 
functions: an enterprise function and a regional function.    Specifically, many big businesses (energy, 
resources, steel, non-ferrous, timber, and others) have their own company towns throughout the 
nation. 
As of 8 July 2009, 467 cities and 332 new subdivisions rank among company towns
20.  This 
accounts for 25% of the total urban population and 40% of GRP.  They belong to the following 
sectors: timber processing, machinery, food processing, and energy.    Among these company towns, 
big businesses operate and finance social infrastructure for municipalities in 147 cities.  Economic 
crisis, however, has drastically changed this, and there have been cases of large-scale dismissal.  
Residents-employees lost their trust in the government and business.  In 2010, the government 
support programme included 86 cities for subsidies.  Pikalevo can also be counted as a critical 
                                                            
20  For statistical data on single-industry towns, see Pashintseva, 2009, pp.3–7. 
  17company town case. 
The third inheritance for CSR is intra-firm human relations based on family principles, which is 
similar to the Japanese type.    This can be observed in vertically-integrated companies such as those 
in the oil and gas sector (Lukoil model): the company provides various kinds of welfare goods, 
including corporate pension, medical insurance, residence, corporate scholarship, and others.  In 
this case, employees have power as stakeholders.  CSR is identified from the perspective of 
employees, through collective agreement.  Collective agreement (according to Article 41 of the 
Labour Code) determines labour relations and plays the role of CSR.  Particularly in cases where 
the trade union is weak, its responsibility is transferred to CSR.  The content of the agreement 
includes the following: general rules, wages, employment, working hours, health and vacation, 
labour conditions, social programs, control of enforcement, and others.    This indicates the relatively 
strong influence of employees as stakeholders (Krichevsky and Goncharov, 2008). 
The third characteristic is the state-led type of Russian CSR.  Governments (federal, regional, 
and municipalities) are strongly influenced by CSR
21.  While the influence of NGOs and other 
actors in civil society is weak, state intervention is strong.  Therefore, philanthropy has the dual 
character of both public policy and business strategy.    Particularly, as far as the top-managers of big 
businesses become politicians or politically influential people, they are apt to combine inward 
motivation of CSR with outward motivation based on formal rules.  As a result, stakeholders 
requested formalization (making agreements) and/or authorization of CSR.    Within the government, 
bureaucrats increase their interests in CSR, resulting in corruption hazards.    Obligatory social codes 
and social standardization have become typical in CSR.  According to an investigation in 2003, 
one-third of companies regard CSR as Code or Regulations and only 12% has their own CSR 
principles.  13% of managers regarded CSR as a part of business strategy.  The local Duma also 
affects CSR.    For example, in Chelyabinsk city Duma, 40% of PMs are managers of big businesses, 
20% are lower managers, 20% are representatives of municipalities, and 20% are doctors or teachers.   
CSR has an obligatory character and formal directive (Peregudov and Semenenko, 2008, p.289).   
CSR became a kind of agreement or social policy between companies and local governments.  
For example, in Perm krai, a regional act on ‘Social Partnership’ was adopted for the realization of 
corporate citizen principles.    Therefore, CSR has a quasi-obligatory form and illustrates the Russian 
CSR model, as is suggested in the case of PPP.  The Ministry of Health and Social Development 
published a report on social partnership at the end of 2006, and at a Duma public hearing in March 
2007, ‘CSR: Object, Tasks, Problems, and Legal Restrictions’ were carried out.  The government 
stimulated CSR, and RSPP attached importance to the role of governments in the development of 
CSR.  The Russian model is similar to the continental type of CSR with regard to the strong 
influence of the government (legalization) (Peregudov and Semenenko, 2008, pp.289–319).  
                                                            
21  A typical case of government intervention is Pikalevo (announcement of Prime Minister Putin, on 4 June 2009). 
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and an arbitrary choice may occur, based on mutual negotiation.    (2) Agreements take priority over 
general rules.  (3) As the financial flow of CSR expenditure is not directed to the budget, 
expenditure becomes opaque and there are risks of corruption (A. Oleinik, Vedmosti, 21 May 2010).   
If Russian business is deeply involved in corruption (Transparency International 2009) and if 
managers and politicians indicate duplication, authorization through agreements can injure CSR, 
although they can put pressure on the voluntarism of CSR. 
Fourthly, CSR cannot reduce corporate scandals and corruption and has, in fact, worsened 
corruption in Russia.    As the Transparency International ‘Corruption Perception Index 2009’ shows, 
Russia cannot escape corruption and distrust.  In fact, CSR is utilized as a tool for corruption and 
many bureaucrats have gained money through CSR activities (Profil’, No.27, 19 July 2010). 
Finally, responsibility may be concentrated in a single, dominant owner-manager.  As the 
ownership structure of Russian companies indicates a high share of insiders and a high degree of 
concentration of ownership, large owners have a responsibility to the firm.  In short, corporate 
governance characterizes Russian CSR. 
 
 
6. Comparison between Russian and Japanese CSR 
In order to clarify the characteristics of Russian CSR here, I will compare CSR between Russia and 
Japan.  J firms traditionally contributed to social operations either through in-house welfare 
provision or through charity activity (philanthropy).    In the 2000s, pressured by CSR in the US and 
Europe, J firms and business society turned their attention to CSR, and have participated in it with 
the development of NGOs as important stakeholders.  Many firms have already tackled CSR and 
published non-financial reports.  In addition, CSR covers not only core business, but also supplier 
chains and concerned companies.  A typical J firm in CSR can be characterized by the following: 
sales are large; overseas sales and shareholding of foreigners are high; and manufacturing connected 
with ecology is relatively high.  In 2005, 75.2% firms used CSR, according to the questionnaire 
survey by Nihon Keidanren (Tanimoto, 2006). 
      Japan Research Institute (2007) shows that more than 90% of firms determined ethical behaviour 
code and that 60% published it in reports.  Japan Research Institute (2010)
22 concluded that 
ecology activity has increased.  About 70% of firms have demonstrated an affirmative attitude 
towards the ambitious government policy, and non-manufacturing has drastically increased in 
ecology CSR.  However, the attitude to social policy and human resource management is not so 
active. 
Therefore, an understanding of and the practical measures of CSR in Japan have their own 
                                                            
22  Data from 361 companies both cases (2007, 2010). 
  19specificities, even though J firms have improved in these measures (Ebashi, 2009).    The main field 
has been ecological CSR in Japan, which has been based on civic movement and ecological NGOs.   
In contrast, the labour aspect of CSR seems to be insufficient, because of the high share of 
irregularly employed and the gender gaps in lifetime employment.    Therefore, human rights in CSR 
are regarded as relatively inactive.  Next, CSR is often mixed with compliance (observance of 
laws).    Not only companies but also various stakeholders have sought to strengthen this regulation.   
Therefore, the domestic operations of CSR are more popular, and J firms challenge global CSR.  
Moreover, the relation between corporate scandals and CSR activity is riddled with contradictions.  
Even though CSR developed in the 2000s, and all companies were interested in it, corporate 
scandals have often occurred.  These corporate scandals have enhanced the importance of CSR in 
Japan (Nikkankougyou, 22 February 2010).  CSR in J firms is deeply affected by its own 
composition of stakeholders and the path-dependent evolution of companies’ social functions. 
Russia and Japan are both backward in comparison to European CSR, specificities, and global 
pressure.    Above all, in both countries, business organizations actively promoted CSR in the 2000s.   
In Russia, RSPP and the Managers’ Association aggressively promote the formalization of CSR.  
CSR was developed by firms and business society in Japan, of which Nippon Keidanren (Japan 
Business Federation) and Keizai Doyukai have been the most active. 
   Nippon Keidanren adopted the Charter for Good Corporate Behaviour to promote ethical 
behaviour, with revisions in 1996, 2002, and 2004.  In 2003, Keidanren established the 
Subcommittee on socially responsible management, and determined ten items to supplement the 
original principles of corporate behaviour, with ‘An outline for implementation of guidance for 
charter of corporate behaviour’ in 2007. 
Keizai Doyukai has been more active in the CSR sphere.  It published white papers in 2001, 
2003, and 2007 and suggested various measures for environmental and social policies.  The recent 
proposal, ‘Creating a New Style of Japanese Management’, considered a new style of Japanese 
management as a tool for strengthening international competitiveness in May 2008.  In the new 
model, CSR management becomes the cornerstone of trust with stakeholders.  Keizai Doyukai 
officially announced a new style of Japanese corporate management: ‘it advocated the concept of 
“triple-mirror management” as the vision of ideal corporate management, which placed importance 
on capital markets (shareholders), employees (employment), and society.   It positioned CSR as the 
basis of all the business activities related to corporate management and proposed “CSR that creates 
future value”, where corporate managers fulfilled social responsibility with their entrepreneur spirit’ 
(Keizai Doyukai, 2009). 
      However, the attitude of business towards the government is different between Russia and Japan.   
In Western countries and in Japan, CSR is voluntary in companies, and government commitment is 
marginal.  In contrast, the role of the government in Russia is large.  According to data from the 
  20Managers’ Association in 2005
23 , administrative pressure became the main motivation for 
companies (73% of respondents), whereas the voluntary action of top managers was relatively weak 
(55%).  Bureaucrats also showed a similar attitude towards CSR (Belyaeva and Eskindarov, 2008, 
p.107).    Moreover, in Russia, public and private partnership is now regarded as contingent on CSR.   
The intervention of the state is regarded as the basic difference between Japan and Russia and other 
countries.  At the same time, the maturity level of NPOs and NGOs in Russia is low and the 
business society does not have sufficient monitoring potential.   The varying influences of different 
stakeholders determine the acceptance of CSR in society. 
   With respect to the acceptance of CSR, J firms regard CSR not as a cost, but as a corporate 
strategy (Figure 4); bottom-up type management as well as market competitive pressure strongly 
influence CSR.  Table 5 shows a sharp increase in the strategic approach of CSR and a sharp 
decline in obligatory burden and costs.  In Russia, administrative pressure is strong, and R firms 
regard CSR as a social cost of survival.  Therefore, CSR is determined by law and by legal 
precedent.  In Russia, 58% of R firms put CSR into effect through collective contracts, 29% carry 
out both co-operative moral and ethical codes, and 22% implement the ethical code (Ekonomika i 
Zhizn’, No.2, January 2009).    In Russia, CSR may require authorization for all stakeholders.   
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23  The number of samples is 210 managers in 2005 September–October (Managers’ Association, 2005). 
  21Table 5 Understanding of CSR in Japan (%) 
CSR  understanding  2003 2006 2010 2010–2003 
Core  of  business  51 69 71 +20 
Costs  65 55 51 -14 
Core business strategy  8  16  31  +23 
Requirements of law and social 
norms 
59 47 34 -25 
Source: Keizai Doyukai, 2010 
 
A hypertrophied role of state means the weakness of civil society (Polishchuk, 2009).  This 
power creates institutional complementarities, and the state regards CSR as a path of intervention.  
In short, various official rules and institutions support CSR.  Even though the state plays a 
relatively strong role in the continental type of CSR, Russia has demonstrated over-centralization of 
the state.    Particularly, due to the weakness of NGOs, the state becomes more and more centralized.   
As a result, the strong state role of Russian CSR stimulates formalization, and CSR has a character 
of public policy.    On the other hand, J firms try to link CSR with business strategy and management.   
In order to escape from the excessive legal burden, business society is reluctant to legalize CSR. 
Moreover, a comparison of Russia and Japan shows that stakeholders and corporate governance 
have strongly affected CSR.    According to Friedman (1962), in CSR activities, shareholders can be 
regarded as the main stakeholders.  Japanese ownership drastically changed in the 1990s.  Figure 
4 indicates the percentage distribution of unit shares held by types of shareholders in listed 
companies.    The following changes can be easily seen. 
First, financial institutions sharply reduced their shareholdings after the 1990s.  The banking 
crisis after the collapse of the bubble economy, and the Bank Shareholding Restriction Law, resulted 
in a decline in banks’ holdings
24.  Major commercial banks began selling corporate shares to raise 
funds to dispose of non-performing loans and to meet capital adequacy regulations (Jackson and 
Miyajima, 2007, p.20).  Secondly, although the number of individual shareholders has increased, 
the share of holdings is stagnating or declining.  Thirdly, foreigners have significantly expanded 
their holdings: their shareholdings have increased from 3.9% in 1989 to 25.5% in 2007.  Notably, 
foreigners increased their shareholdings in the following sectors: pharmaceuticals, insurance, 
security, electronics, real estate, and precision machines.  Companies with a high share of foreign 
shareholders have a tendency to change corporate governance into a market-oriented, US type.    We 
can observe an increase of institutional investors, a decline of cross-shareholdings, and an increase 
of insiders. 
Traditional Japanese ownership is drastically changing.  As a result, (1) J firms strengthen 
                                                            
24 ‘Major banks’ shareholdings were 1.5 times Tier 1 capital in March 2001, so they were required to reduce their 
shareholdings by 10 trillion yen’ (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2007, p.91). 
  22transparency and increase corporate values through the release of social and environmental reports, 
(2) J firms raise dividend rates
25, (3) J firms and shareholders attach greater importance to the role of 
IR, including ROE.  J firms have changed their shareholder compositions; corporate scandals and 
the financial crisis have lead to the re-evaluation of traditional Japanese corporate governance.   As 
long as J firms maintain a high share of dividend payments
26, CSR may be regarded as 
shareholder-oriented.  However, promotion of managers within the firm has been maintained, and 
job security is said to have become the most important aspect of CSR
27.    On the other hand, in the 
process of diminishing stable shareholders (financial institutions and concerned companies), insiders 
(company’s own holdings and holdings of managers and employees) have become relatively 
important shareholders.    Thus, employees have become the main stakeholders and shareholders and 
the influence of other stakeholders is relatively moderate. 
   
Table 6 Ownership structure in Russia (%) 
   1995  1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011forecast
 Insiders,  total  54 52  50 50  50 48  51 52 50 
 Managers  11  15 15  19 25 31 35  42  42 
 Workers  43  37 34  28 22 16 13  8  5 
 Outsiders,  total  37 42  42 42  45 45  40 35 38 
 Non-financial  outsiders  27 31  33 34  36 38  31 27 25 
 Outside  individuals  11  15 20  22 21 20 13  18  15 
 Other  enterprises  16  16 13  12 15 18 18  9  10 
 Financial  outsiders   9 9  7 8  8 5  8 6 10 
 State  9  7 7  7 4 7 9  13  12 
Source: Aukutsionek, Dyomina, and Kapelyushnikov, 2009, p.5 
 
In Russia, firms have a high share of insider ownership, as Table 6 indicates.  Specifically, 
managers have retained their holdings, and cases in which ownership and management coincide can 
be observed.  Outsiders occupy a third of holdings, although this does not necessarily indicate an 
increasing trend.  After the start of the financial crisis, although the share of managers and 
employees has drastically reduced, the share of insiders and outsiders has become stable.  
Compared with the ownership of J firms, the government has maintained a strong influence.    The R 
                                                            
25  The ratio of dividends to profits increased from 3% in March 2003 to 9% in March 2008 (Nihon Keizai Shinbun). 
26 Mikiharu Noma insisted on a higher dividend ratio from dividend paying companies than those in the US and in 
European companies.  He points out that Japanese managers have recognized the necessity of an increase of 
corporate value and have adopted a positive attitude towards shareholders (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 5 August 2010).   
27 The president of Keidanren, Fujio Mitarai, stresses that the institutional preservation of an annual pay raise is 
necessary, even though some companies temporarily freeze it (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 19 March 2009). 
  23firm is entirely an owner firm, where functions of ownership and management are concentrated in 
the hands of owner-managers.    Seen as the evolution of a company, the R firm may be regarded as a 
firm in its infancy
28.  Despite the immaturity of corporate governance in Russia, the quality of 
corporate governance has improved since 2002.  The number of companies with relatively good 
governance is increasing and the number of those with weak governance is decreasing.  Highly 
qualified company managements are eager to practice CSR based on the global standard.    Qualified 
state management, competition and development of self-regulated organizations, adoption of code of 
corporate governance, recommendation code, and enhanced transparency have functioned positively 
for corporate governance and for CSR. 
   However, ownership does not simply affect CSR activities.  Generally speaking, the trend 
towards concentration of ownership is strong in Russian corporate governance; concentration in the 
hands of individual shareholders is particularly intense.  According to Dolgopyatova (2009), 
two-thirds of investigated companies have shareholders who held the control packet in 2005–2009, 
and 39% of companies held the control packet without any competitors.  As a result, R firms are 
reluctant to share information, including financial statements, because information may determine 
the survival of the firm.  Many major enterprises, independent of size, choose closed joint-stock 
companies or limited liabilities that are closed to the market.  They do not publicize their owners, 
and their intention to publish social and environment reports is weak.  Financing by internal 
accumulation also strengthens this trend.  When individual ownership is large, dividends increase.  
CSR may be biased towards shareholders, and, in this regard, the R firm bears some resemblance to 
the Anglo-American model. 
The Russian financial crisis in 2008 stimulated a turnover of owners and managers, and the 
government enhanced its power as a shareholder.  The government increased its shares through 
capital injection and through the establishment of state corporations.  Since CSR is influenced by 
the government, its unemployment support function is enhanced. 
Companies have specific strong stakeholders, and dominant owners, employees, and the 
government are the most influential actors in Russia.    CSR reform has been based on the voices of 
the main stakeholders.  According to a questionnaire study on CSR reforms, the government has 
enforced an ineffective policy for the support of companies through CSR (47%); there is no legal 
base to create advantageous conditions for CSR (41%); the stable relationships among local society, 
regional governors, and municipal heads are indispensable to the development of CSR (Kommersant, 
20 July 2006). 
Finally, CSR institution building indicates the path dependent evolution of corporate business 
society.  Japanese CSR is tied to the legacy of business principles.  ‘The philosophy of business, 
typically family precepts, includes some idea of today’s CSR.  Typical examples include “Intoku 
                                                            
28  See Osawa, 2004, Chapter 1. 
  24Yoho
29” and “Sanpo Yoshi
30”.    This tradition is often passed on to companies founded after World 
War II.    A representative example is “A company is a public entity of society” (Panasonic)’ (Keizai 
Doyukai, 2010).   
Russian CSR is also strongly affected by historical experiences.  The tasks, contents, and 
stakeholders of CSR are strongly affected by the legacy of the Soviet institutions.  Side business 
assets, company towns, and human relations within the firm may be regarded as the legacy of the 
Soviet system.  The limitless extension of CSR also reminds us of the ‘Soviet enterprise’, which 
integrated economic and social functions under political power.  Therefore, CSR has a dual 
meaning for Russian corporations: the continuation of the former system and the transplantation of 
global new institutions.  In short, Russian CSR may be a hybrid or mixed type: on the one hand, 
CSR is a strategy for maintaining existing structures; on the other hand, CSR is transplanted from 
developed countries, and global standards have infiltrated Russia.  As a result, Russian CSR is a 
mixture of the continental type and the path dependent type (paternalistic type).  Therefore, ‘CSR 
in Russia differed from industrialized nations not only in its disproportionally high scale, but also in 
its patterns, mechanisms, and driving forces’ (Polishchuk, 2009).  Path dependent institutions 
mitigated the costs of market failure. 
 
 
7. Perspective of ‘varieties of CSR’ 
We will first conclude the comparison of CSR in Russia and Japan.  The following features are 
common to CSR in Russia and Japan: Responsibility is weak, and both are backward compared to 
Europe.    The company city is a common problem in the crisis.    Business circles are active in CSR 
promotion.  Globalization and transnationalization have strongly affected CSR penetration.   
Specifically, foreign companies have drastically changed their attitudes towards CSR.  As a result, 
there is a hybrid type of global and path-dependent CSR in both countries. 
At the same time, we can observe the critical differences between Russia and Japan.    CSR in R 
firms is premature because they concentrate on fundamental activities.  Moreover, these firms are 
very interested in authorization and formalization as public policy, because of the strong stakeholder 
‘government’.    As a result, CSR cannot escape parasitic elements.    As the main sectors of CSR are 
energy- and resource- related, the role of the state is amplified; with all the social policy that is 
included in CSR, CSR may well be regarded as hyper.    On the other hand, however, J firms regard 
CSR to be management and strategy.  Paradoxically speaking, this is why CSR develops after the 
corporate scandals.  All companies have homogenized their measures.  The main field of CSR is 
ecology, and other social fields are relatively weak.  The Japanese case also shows weak pressure 
                                                            
29  Doing good secretly gives him/her obvious benefits. 
30 Business should satisfy society in general and give happiness to the seller and the buyer.  This is the philosophy 
of the merchants in the Omi district, literally meaning good for seller, buyer, and society. 
  25from stakeholders. 
An investigation of Russian CSR and its comparison with the Japanese model leads to the 
varieties of CSR.    This view suggests the following points. 
First of all, the interests of stakeholders determine the variety.  Considering the power of 
stakeholders in Japan and Russia, different stakeholders and different pressures on CSR produce 
varieties of CSR despite the general trend of convergence due to global pressures (Table 7). 
In J firms, employees
31 are strongly motivated to preserve employment, while the stance of 
shareholders has increased after the importation of the US governance model.  The influence of 
other stakeholders on CSR has also intensified, and philanthropy has become more important for a 
company’s success.  With regard to customers’ interest, while insiders (managers and employees) 
give the highest priority to customers, customers (consumers) do not have enough power in 
companies.  In R firms, the power of the regional government is strong and can authorize and 
legalize CSR.  The communal nature of firms and Russian corporate governance clearly 
characterizes this trend.    The responsibility of the company may be identified with that of the state, 
as in China.  Even so, the following aspects may be emphasized as common to both.  The firm 
does not downplay the communal character. 
 
Table 7 Power of stakeholders in Japan and Russia 
  Shareholders  Employees Customers Suppliers  Region 
/Society 
Government










   In short, the composition and power of stakeholders determines the national characteristics of 
CSR.    Stakeholders determine the distribution of CSR utilities, and the structure of corporate social 
capital (degree of relations between business and society) determines the stakeholders.  When the 
government (municipalities) and the company cooperate in CSR activities, regional and sector gaps 
in CSR benefits may result (Russia). 
      The above observation tells us of the effectiveness of stakeholder biased CSR.    Once again, we 
follow Drucker (Pearce, Maciariello, and Yamawaki, 2010).  The cornerstone of business missions 
is the examination of stakeholders.    Drucker concluded that the key stakeholder in business is not a 
                                                            
31 Employees are restricted in regular employment.  Irregular employees are relatively weak CSR players, and 
companies do not provide sufficient skill formation education to employees in the affiliated companies of foreign 
countries (Japan Research Institute, 2010). 
  26parasite worm, and emphasized the order of stakeholders
32.  A comparison between Russia and 
Japan shows that there is no single model stakeholder and that each country has its own polestar 
stakeholder. 
   Secondly, CSR is regarded as a concept of public policy.  By diminishing the role of the 
government, CSR contributes to policy formation (Fujii and Shintani, 2008).    However, the method 
is different in each country.    While, in Russia, authorization or legalization is indispensable to CSR, 
generally speaking, authorization is unnecessary.    The boundaries of responsibility and authority of 
business and governments in Russia are more unclear than in Japan.  The government demands 
voluntary operations.    As long as companies ensure welfare provision for employees and artificially 
organize the company town (Toyota in Japan), the role of public policy will be enhancing. 
      Thirdly, CSR is a product of corporate governance, public policy, and the accumulation of social 
capital.  In practice, stakeholders such as governments, shareholders, employees, and residents try 
to link their interests through CSR.  ‘CSR stakeholders bear the costs of corporate social giving in 
exchange for their own social payoffs’ (Aoki, 2010, p.105).  Then, institutional complementarities 
(re-coupling the social aspects and economic aspects) function in CSR activities.    On the other hand, 
CSR is regarded as a tool for controlling stakeholders through legal methods (Ekonomika i zhizn’, 
No.2, 2009). 
   The ‘varieties of CSR’ approach can characterize capitalism from the perspective of the 
corporation, society, and the government.    Even though excessive responsibility must not be given, 




A comparative analysis of CSR (in Japan and Russia) allows the characterization of corporate 
(business) society.  Japanese CSR is said to not last as long as the types of CSR found in Europe 
and the US (Tanimoto, 2008).  Market evaluation is inactive and SRI is also on a relatively small 
scale.  The lack of progressiveness stems from the characteristics of corporate governance and 
employment.  In addition, the immaturity of markets and civil society exacerbates this 
backwardness.    However, Japanese CSR has developed on its own ‘quasi-community’ organization 
(Dore, 2006).    A CSR comparison reveals large differences between Japan and Russia, since Russia 
does not have as many CSR institutions as Japan.    The backwardness of corporate governance and 
employment is also greater than that in Japan.  The market and citizens cannot evaluate CSR and 
corporate values, and SRI is negligible; however, the government has a strong impact on CSR, and 
codified CSR influences have functioned in major companies.    Moreover, the regional society has a 
                                                            
32 Drucker regards the core stakeholder as follows: customers in Asia, employees in France, and society in 
Scandinavia. 
  27motivation to develop CSR due to the linkage of corporate welfare.  In short, both countries have 
some CSR similarities.  Namely, CSR is based on the communal relations of insiders in the firm.  
Specifically, ‘in Russia the quiet revolution happens in the CSR sphere’ (Vedomosti, 9 December 
2008). 
Russian CSR can be regarded as hyper as well as premature and small-scaled.  These 
contradictory findings characterize Russian CSR.  The interests of dominant shareholders and 
government-business relations are hypertrophied.  However, under the influence of dominant 
shareholders and the government, various stakeholders have weakened their interests.  From the 
stakeholder approach, Russian CSR may well be characterized as immature.  It is natural for the 
stakeholders (polestar stakeholders) to determine the national specificities of CSR. 
   Russia has extraordinary stakeholders, and the government plays a specific role in CSR.  Not 
only the traditional role of the government and regions but also an increase in state intervention and 
a response to the global crisis have become the source of state-led CSR.  Apart from the 
government, employees also stimulate CSR.  Thus, the state is concerned with concluding CSR 
agreements, and employees are concerned with collective agreement on CSR.  Both actors require 
the formalization of CSR, and legalization may be similar to that of continental CSR.  However, 
Russian formalization dampens voluntarism. 
Russian CSR is deeply rooted in Russia’s history, making it a product of path dependent 
development.    Even though companies have already changed to the market-type, they cannot break 
free of their traditional tasks and network.  However, we cannot ignore the new influences from 
abroad.    CSR in Russia was stimulated by the UN Global Compact.    In short, the globalization and 
multi-nationalization of Russian corporations and the market competition and diversification of the 
urban economy have facilitated the adoption of global CSR standards.  However, the economic 
crisis has boosted state-led and public policy.  As long as the interests of stakeholders are decisive 
in CSR, CSR seems to enhance its role as a public policy.  This trend is common to Russia and 
Japan. 
As far as the experiences of Russia and Japan show, both countries have created a hybrid CSR 
and have simultaneously brought about indicated path-dependent and global changes.    Even though 
each country has kept its specificity, coincidence among economic tasks, social tasks, and 
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